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CODETERMINATION, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,COMMITMENT, 
AND SEQUENTIAL GAMES: Comment 
by 
Ekkehart S c h l i c h t 
C o d e t e r m i n a t i o n and c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g a r e d i s t i n g u i s h e d , 
a c c o r d i n g t o McCain, by t h e e x i s t e n c e o f c e r t a i n management p r e -
r o g a t i v e s i n t h e l a t t e r . These c r e a t e f i r s t mover advantages 
( S c h e l l i n g 1960), which e x p l a i n s why c a p i t a l f a v o r s c o l l e c t i v e 
b a r g a i n i n g over c o d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Furthermore, these f i r s t mover 
advantages c r e a t e i n e f f i c i e n c i e s of t h e p r i s o n e r s ' dilemma t y p e : 
management w i l l t a k e i n t o account t h a t i t s d e c i s i o n s , r e g a r d i n g 
investment p r o j e c t s , f o r i n s t a n c e , might improve t h e b a r g a i n i n g 
p o s i t i o n o f l a b o r and w i l l be e x p l o i t e d by l a b o r a c c o r d i n g l y . 
These p o s i t i o n a l s h i f t s m ight l e a d t o s o c i a l l y i n e f f i c i e n t d e c i -
s i o n s , t h a t i s , t o Pareto i n f e r i o r outcomes. A l t h o u g h repeated 
n e g o t i a t i o n s might l e a d t o i m p l i c i t o r e x p l i c i t c o o p e r a t i v e 
agreements a v o i d i n g these i n e f f i c i e n c i e s , c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g 
i s v u l n e r a b l e i n t h i s sense, and c o d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s more 
f a v o u r a b l e t o c o o p e r a t i v e s o l u t i o n s s i n c e b a r g a i n i n g i n v o l v e s a l l 
a l t e r n a t i v e s from t h e o u t s e t here, and p r e r o g a t i v e s l e a d i n g t o 
those p r i s o n e r s ' dilemma t y p e o f i n e f f i c i e n c i e s a re absent. 
That i s t h e argument i n f a v o r o f c o d e t e r m i n a t i o n forwarded by 
McCain. My r o l e , as a commentator, i s t o r a i s e p o i n t s o f c r i t i -
cism, and I s h a l l t r y t o do so, a l t h o u g h I f e e l uneasy because 
McCain's case i s w e l l - t a k e n . 
I submit, hence, t h a t McCain's argument i n f a v o r o f codeter-
m i n a t i o n unduly n e g l e c t s p o s s i b l e i n e f f i c i e n c i e s o f co d e t e r m i -
n a t i o n b o t h on t h e f i r m l e v e l and on t h e l e v e l o f t h e i n d u s t r y , 
and t h a t c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g might prove s u p e r i o r i n s p i t e o f 
some shortcomings. 
1. T r a n s a c t i o n Costs Under A l t e r n a t i v e Arrangements 
My f i r s t o b s e r v a t i o n i s t h a t t h e f i r m ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n does n o t 
e f f e c t e f f i c i e n c y i f b e h a v i o r can be observed and t r a n s a c t i o n 
c o s t s a r e n e g l e c t e d : c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g , c o d e t e r m i n a t i o n , o r 
untrammeled c a p i t a l i s m d e s c r i b e d i f f e r e n t assignments o f d e c i s i o n 
r i g h t s among employers, employees, and unio n s . I f t h e p a r t i e s i n -
v o l v e d can e n t e r b i n d i n g c o n t r a c t s , a l l i n e f f i c i e n c i e s can be 
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c o n t r a c t e d away q u i t e i n d e p e n d e n t l y of which assignment o f d e c i ­
s i o n r i g h t s p r e v a i l s , and e f f i c i e n c y arguments cannot be d e c i s i v e 
w i t h r e g a r d t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h o i c e s . T h i s i s s i m p l y t h e Coase 
Theorem a p p l i e d t o t h e i s s u e of i n d u s t r i a l democracy. 
As l o n g as b e h a v i o r ( o r i t s consequences) can be observed, ex­
p l i c i t o r i m p l i c i t c o n t r a c t s can be rendered v i a b l e by i n t r o d u c ­
i n g s u i t a b l e s e l f - i m p o s e d p e n a l t i e s i n t h e case of f r a u d . 1 But 
b a r g a i n i n g , t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f p e n a l t i e s , a r b i t r a t i o n boards, 
and so f o r t h , i n t r o d u c e t r a n s a c t i o n c o s t s . Hence, f o r e f f i c i e n c y , 
t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of f i r m s i s t o be chosen such t h a t i t minimizes 
t r a n s a c t i o n c o s t s . I n d u s t r y - w i d e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g emerges as 
t h e n a t u r a l systems s o l u t i o n t o problems t h a t are s i m i l a r across 
f i r m s , whether c o d e t e r m i n a t i o n o r untrammelled c a p i t a l i s m p r e ­
v a i l s i n i t i a l l y : i t solves problems generated by m o b i l i t y c o s t s , 
ex p o s t s m a l l numbers, i d i o s y n c r a s i e s , e t c . , t h a t can o n l y be 
p a r t i a l l y r e s o l v e d by t h e market o r o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n s . * Hence 
t h e i s s u e between c o d e t e r m i n a t i o n and c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g i s 
n o t n e c e s s a r i l y t h e i s s u e between c o o p e r a t i v e and n o n c o o p e r a t i v e 
games as McCain p u t s i t ; i t might be t h e i s s u e between d i f f e r e n t 
games i n v o l v i n g d i f f e r e n t b a r g a i n i n g c o s t s , which can be played 
b o t h c o o p e r a t i v e l y o r n o n - c o o p e r a t i v e l y . 
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As he a d m i t s , c o o p e r a t i o n i s p o s s i b l e and r a t i o n a l J under 
c o d e t e r m i n a t i o n and c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g , s i n c e b o t h i n v o l v e r e ­
peated n e g o t i a t i o n s . Both arrangements w i l l l e a d t o e f f i c i e n t 
outcomes by t h e same argument. I t might even be argued t h a t c o l ­
l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g i s s u p e r i o r t o c o d e t e r m i n a t i o n s i n c e t h e t i m e 
h o r i z o n o f t h e u n i o n i s l o n g e r t h a n t h e t i m e h o r i z o n of the 
worker because t h e worker changes f i r m s more f r e q u e n t l y t h a n the 
u n i o n ( I presume here i n d u s t r y - w i d e u n i o n s ) . F u r t h e r m o r e , i n d u s ­
t r y - w i d e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g saves on b a r g a i n i n g c o s t s . I n Ger­
many we observe, f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t s t r i k e s are r e s t r i c t e d t o a 
sample of f i r m s a l t h o u g h the d i s p u t e concerns t h e e n t i r e i n d u s ­
t r y . Under c o d e t e r m i n a t i o n , s t r i k e s o r s t r i k e - e q u i v a l e n t s are 
necessary w i t h i n each f i r m t o achieve t h e same r e s u l t , t h a t i s , 
t o w i t n e s s t h e degree of d e t e r m i n a t i o n of l a b o r s h o u l d t h e em­
p l o y e r s a n t i c i p a t e i t i n c o r r e c t l y . But as l o n g as these i n f o r m a ­
t i o n a l d e f i c i e n c i e s are absent, and g i v e n r a t i o n a l b e h a v i o r , 
s t r i k e s and l o c k o u t s w i l l n o t occur under e i t h e r c o d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
o r c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g : t h e y are s i m p l y t h r e a t s f o r a c h i e v i n g 
b e t t e r b a r g a i n i n g r e s u l t s , and s i m i l a r t h r e a t s - e q u i v a l e n t s 
of s t r i k e s and l o c k o u t s - w i l l emerge under c o d e t e r m i n a t i o n as 
l e v e r s f o r a c h i e v i n g a s t r o n g p o s i t i o n i n b a r g a i n i n g . Indeed, 
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those t h r e a t s may cause more harm under c o d e t e r m i n a t i o n because 
t h e y m i g h t d e s t r o y t h e s p i r i t o f c o o p e r a t i o n . C o n f l i c t s ought t o 
be c h a n n e l l e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i n o r d e r t o m i n i m i z e t h e i r moral 
havoc, and c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g i s n o t t o o bad i n t h i s r e s p e c t . 
C o d e t e r m i n a t i o n , however, might r e q u i r e a c e r t a i n dose o f p r o f i t 
s h a r i n g t o m i t i g a t e c o n f l i c t s o f i n t e r e s t . 
A l l t h i s q u a l i f i e s McCain's argument i n s o f a r as he assumes 
t h a t s t r i k e s w i l l occur under c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g b u t n o t under 
c o d e t e r m i n a t i o n . That assumption g i v e s an undeserved advantage t o 
c o d e t e r m i n a t i o n from t h e o u t s e t . 
2. The Spreading of Welfare 
C o d e t e r m i n a t i o n means t h a t , w i t h i n each f i r m , o n l y t h e incum-
bent workers have a say. Hence d e c i s i o n s w i l l be t w i s t e d i n f a v o r 
of t h e employed, n e g l e c t i n g t h e wishes o f t h e unemployed. I f 
t h e r e i s a t r a d e - o f f between h i g h e r wages f o r t h e incumbent work-
ers o r h i g h e r employment, d e c i s i o n s w i l l be b i a s e d a g a i n s t a d d i -
t i o n a l employment, which i m p l i e s i n e f f i c i e n c i e s as w e l l as severe 
i n j u s t i c e t o o u t s i d e workers - whether unemployed o r employed 
under bad c o n d i t i o n s elsewhere. I n o t h e r words, c o d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
of i n d u s t r y , c o n s i d e r e d as a system, l a c k s t h e d i s p e r s i v e f o r c e s 
s p r e a d i n g w e l f a r e gains t h r o u g h o u t t h e system which are p r o v i d e d 
under untrammeled c a p i t a l i s m by p e r f e c t m o b i l i t y and u t i l i t y t a k -
i n g o f l a b o r . I n view o f t h e i n c r e a s i n g impediments t o m o b i l i t y 
- t h r o u g h v a r i o u s s p e c i f i c i t i e s , i d i o s y n c r a s i e s and ex p o s t s m a l l 
numbers - those w e l f a r e - s p r e a d i n g f o r c e s are p a r a l y z e d , however, 
and untrammeled c a p i t a l i s m tends t o r u n i n t o s i m i l a r problems. 
I n d u s t r y - w i d e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g m i g h t be viewed as a 
p r o v i s i o n a l s o l u t i o n here as l o n g as no i n s t i t u t i o n s and i n c e n -
t i v e s t r u c t u r e s are c r e a t e d which l e a d t o an adequate spreading 
of w e l f a r e gains under c o d e t e r m i n a t i o n , and t o a v o i d i n g those i n -
e f f i c i e n c i e s generated by n e g l e c t i n g t h e i n t e r e s t s o f non-incum-
bents . 
3. Miscellaneous Remarks 
L e t me add, however, some more g e n e r a l remarks r e g a r d i n g Mc-
Cain 's a n a l y s i s . 
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I doubt t h a t we should r e l y t o o much on game t h e o r y and r e -
l a t e d r a t i o n a l i t y concepts s i n c e experiments suggest t h a t people 
behave q u i t e d i f f e r e n t l y from what game t h e o r y p r e d i c t s i n many 
i n s t a n c e s , p u r s u i n g h e u r i s t i c s t r a t e g i e s , l o o k i n g f o r f o c a l 
p o i n t s , e t c . ^ A n a l y t i c a l l y , t h i s d i f f i c u l t y i s r e f l e c t e d by arg u -
ments such as " c o o p e r a t i o n i s more l i k e l y " under c o d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
(McCain). S t r i c t l y speaking t h a t argument r e f e r s t o a b e h a v i o r a l 
game t h e o r y t h a t i s s t i l l l a c k i n g - i t has no p l a c e i n a t h e o r y 
where people a r e h e l d t o behave r a t i o n a l l y w i t h p r o b a b i l i t y one. 
Furthermore, we should t a k e t h e s p e c i f i c i t y problem much more 
s e r i o u s l y : i n v e s t m e n t i n s p e c i f i c machinery as w e l l as investment 
i n t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f s p e c i f i c s k i l l s i s t o be p r o t e c t e d , and 
g r a n t i n g p r e r o g a t i v e s t o those who have made these commitments 
might serve t h i s e n d . 5 Emphasizing t h e s p e c i f i c i t y problem i n 
t h i s c o n t e x t i n t e r l i n k s t h e i s s u e o f c o d e t e r m i n a t i o n w i t h t h e i s -
sue o f l a b o r s p e c i f i c i t y and i n t r o d u c e s f u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t i o n s 
w i t h o u t s o l v i n g any o t h e r problems, of course. 
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Footnotes * 
1 I f b e h a v i o r cannot be observed, adequate i n c e n t i v e s are t o be 
p r o v i d e d anyhow, and c o o p e r a t i v e s o l u t i o n s i n t h e b a r g a i n i n g 
sense a r e i m p o s s i b l e . P r e r o g a t i v e s w i t h r e g a r d t o these a c t i v i -
t i e s as w e l l as n o n c o o p e r a t i o n are unavoidable from t h e o u t s e t 
here. 
2 See W i l l i a m s o n (1975, ch. 4 ) . 
^ S e l t e n ' s (1978) " i n d u c t i o n argument" renders a l l f i n i t e games 
of c o n f l i c t n o n c o o p e r a t i v e , and t h e game-theoretic p r o p o s a l s f o r 
e x p l a i n i n g c o o p e r a t i o n as r a t i o n a l , which McCain c i t e s , i n t r o d u c e 
elements o f i r r a t i o n a l i t y . Hence t h e r e are some a n a l y t i c a l prob-
lems i n v o l v e d here, b u t i n t r o d u c i n g c r e d i b l e commitments through 
s e l f - i m p o s e d p e n a l i t i e s m i g h t s o l v e some of these problems. 
^ See S e l t e n and Stoecker. 
5 A l c h i a n (1984). 
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